Karl Popper a falszifikációról és az alulhatározottságról

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In this session, we’ll explore two central challenges in the philosophy of science: Karl Popper’s falsificationism and the problem of underdetermination. Popper argued that scientific theories should make predictions that could, in principle, prove them wrong. But what happens when a prediction fails? Does this mean the theory is false, or could the problem lie in the assumptions behind the test? We’ll examine why evidence does not always point to a single explanation, and what this means for scientific objectivity and rational belief. Together, we’ll discuss how scientists should respond to conflicting evidence, what makes a theory genuinely testable, and whether evidence alone can determine which theory we should accept. 📄 Readings 1. Karl Popper and falsificationism — Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Science and Pseudo-Science, Section 4.3, “Popper’s falsificationism.” [https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pseudo-science/#PoppFals](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pseudo-science/#PoppFals) 2. Underdetermination of scientific theory — Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Underdetermination of Scientific Theory. Read the Introduction and Section 1, “A First Look: Duhem, Quine, and the Problems of Underdetermination.” [https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-underdetermination/](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-underdetermination/) Looking forward to seeing you!